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Fast Food, Addiction,
and Market Power
Timothy J. Richards, Paul M. Patterson,
and Stephen F. Hamilton
Many attribute the rise in obesity since the early 1980s to the overconsumption of
fast food. A dynamic model of a differentiated-product industry equilibrium shows
that a firm with market power will price below marginal cost in a steady-state
equilibrium. A spatial hedonic pricing model is used to test whether fast food firms
set prices in order to exploit their inherent addictiveness. The results show that
firms price products dense in addictive nutrients below marginal cost, but price
products high in nonaddictive nutrients higher than would be the case in perfect
competition.
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Introduction
From 1982 to 2003, expenditure on fast food in the U.S. rose from $26.5 billion to $126.7
billion-an annual rate of growth of 6.4%, over 2% higher than the growth rate of at
home food consumption (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2005). At the same time, the
percentage ofconsumers regarded as obese more than doubled, rising from roughly 14%
to 30% (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005). While there are many other
factors that have contributed to the rise in obesity, some regard increasing consumption
of fast food as one of the most important (Chou, Grossman, and Saffer, 2004).1
Not surprisingly, fast food companies have grown rapidly over this time period and
have become highly profitable, despite frequent price wars and the prevalence of low
cost "value" meals. Indeed, the average annual return on equity for the top five fast food
firms in the United States from 1999-2004 was 19.4%, versus 15.8% for restaurants
more generally.2 On the surface, it would appear these companies have successfully
differentiated themselves from one another through advertising, merchandise promo
tion, store attributes (play areas, aesthetic decor, attention to cleanliness), and product
design. However, others suggest that the rapid growth and high profitability offast food
Timothy J. Richards is Power Professor and Paul M. Patterson is associate professor, both in the Morrison School of
Management and Agribusiness, Arizona State University East, Mesa; Stephen F. Hamilton is professor, Orfalea College of
Business, Cal Poly University, San Luis Obispo. This project was supported by the National Research Initiative of the
Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service, USDA, Grant No. 2005-35400-15852.
Review coordinated by George C. Davis.
1 Other explanations in the recent literature include the reduced cost of calorie consumption relative to expenditure
(Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro, 2003) and a variety of other factors, including anti-smoking laws and increased restaurant
density (Rashad, Grossman, and Chou, 2006).
2 Net profit margin for the top five fast food firms averaged 8.25% versus 6.58% for the restaurant group as a whole. The
top five publicly traded firms include McDonalds, Yum! Brands, Wendy's International, Sonic Corporation, and Triarc
Companies.
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firms is due to their ability to exploit the inherent addictiveness of fast food. Yet, to
date, no empirical support has been offered for this assertion. Accordingly, this study
seeks to test whether fast food firms price as if their products are addictive in an
imperfectly competitive, steady-state equilibrium.
There is evidence from medical research that the nutrients in fast food are inherently
addictive (Colantuoni et aI., 2002; Grigson, 2002; Del Parigi et aI., 2003). Some research
suggests fast food firms have learned to exploit this fact in the design and pricing of
their products (Drewnowski and Darmon, 2005; White et aI., 2002). Because nutrients
are not firm-specific, nutrient addictiveness cannot be a source ofmarket power. Rather,
any market power fast food firms may have must instead derive from the success of the
differentiation strategies described above. When addictiveness is combined with market
power, however, prices can differ significantly from those set by competitive firms
(Villas-Boas, 2006; Driskill and McCafferty, 2001; Showalter, 1999). Namely, if a firm
with market power recognizes that it sells an addictive product, then it has an incentive
to reduce price-even below marginal cost-in expectation of higher future demand.
Without market power, individual firms do not have an incentive to price below
marginal cost because they cannot appropriate the future gains from doing so. In this
sense, addiction to nutrients is akin to a common property resource-i.e., the size ofthe
pool of addicted consumers is a benefit to all, but none have the incentive to "produce"
the benefit by reducing prices.
While both the theoretical (Iannaccone, 1986; Becker and Murphy, 1988) and
empirical (Becker, Grossman, and Murphy, 1994; Cawley, 1999) implications of the
rational addiction model for firms in competition are well understood, there are few
tests of addictive-product pricing by firms with market power. Among empirical studies,
Cawley (1999) finds support for the rational addiction model in calories, while Richards
and Patterson (2004) fail to reject a rational addiction to macronutrients (protein,
fat, and carbohydrates) in a panel-data set of household snack food consumption.
Empirically, rational addiction differs from mere habituation in that consumers respond
to expected future costs and benefits of consuming the addictive product. Testing for
rational addiction, therefore, would seem to require detailed, time-series data on
individual consumption behavior. Nevertheless, with only a cross-section of publicly
available fast food prices, it is still possible to test indirectly for rational addiction
because the implications of addiction for firm behavior are very clear. We test these
implications by estimating a steady-state equilibrium model of fast food pricing and
demand which explicitly allows for the possibility that the nutrients in fast food are
addictive. 3
Nutrient content, however, is also the primary means by which fast food firms
differentiate their products. In a dynamic model, therefore, it is difficult to determine
whether firms design their products in order to build brand loyalty through differ
entiation, or if they instead mimic one another and set prices in order to exploit the
addictiveness of fast food in general. In fact, there are four possible combinations of
pricing and product design strategies that may describe fast food firm behavior:

3 The steady-state equilibrium assumption is reasonable given the nature ofthe fast food industry. Although fast food firms
constantly introduce and promote new products, the prices for the products used in this study have not changed in a
significant way for several years.
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• First, if there is evidence that fast food firms differentiate like products from each
other (e.g., hamburgers from firm A are different than hamburgers from firm B)
and if they price products high in addictive nutrients (fat and sugar) below
marginal cost, then firms are pricing to exploit brand loyalty.4
• Second, if firms design foods that imitate rivals' offerings and price foods dense
with addictive nutrients below marginal cost, then they implicitly collude in order
to expand the total number of addicted consumers in the market. In other words,
firms internalize the dynamic externality created by addictiveness in a collective
way.
• Third, by allowing for both intra- and inter-firm differentiation, we allow for the
case where firms differentiate individual products from those oftheir competitors',
but cluster their own products around a common nutritional strategy. This is a
scenario where firms build brand loyalty through differentiation, but then exploit
the inherent addictiveness of their products to a cohort of loyal consumers.
• Finally, if firms do not price goods with addictive nutrients any lower than other
nutrients, it is clear that the common-property nature of addictiveness dominates
and fast foods are priced as they would be in a competitive, albeit differentiated,
industry. In this case, the potential future rents to the industry as a whole are not
being captured by any of its member firms.
To test among these possible outcomes, we estimate a spatial model offast food pricing
behavior based on the distance metric (DM) approach ofPinkse, Slade, and Brett (2002)
and Pinkse and Slade (2004). In the DM model, hamburgers, french fries, chicken
sandwiches, and other items offered by fast food chains are arrayed in a multi-dimen
sional attribute space in which the distance between competing products is readily
measurable. 5 With this approach, it is possible to test whether fast food firms price their
products collusively in order to take advantage of some common source of demand
(addiction), or to exploit any market power that may arise from differentiating them
selves in the conventional way (brand loyalty). The methods developed in the spatial
econometrics literature are ideally suited for answering questions of this type.
The paper begins by describing a simple model of fast food industry equilibrium
where firms compete as oligopolists and demand is linked intertemporally, but depends
on nutrient attributes. The second section presents an empirical model of fast food
pricing that explicitly incorporates distance between products in attribute space as a
4 The phrase "pricing below marginal cost" refers to imperfectly competitive firms that may price some nutrients below
what they would in perfect competition, but not strictly below marginal cost. This phrase is used in the sense ofPakes (2003)
for descriptive purposes only. As Pakes explains, shadow prices for firms with market power are comprised not only of
marginal profit due to a particular attribute, but rather consist of a complex interplay of cost, demand, and technological
forces. Specifically, he derives the hedonic pricing function h(x i ) for a product with attributes x as:

h(Xi)=E(mC(')lxi)+E(a:~.~}ap

H.

where E(·) is the expectation operator, me is marginal cost, and D(') is the direct demand function. Therefore, the "price" of
any attribute can appear to be above its marginal cost due to market power, or below for other reasons, such as those we
identify here.
5 Note that product design and pricing are, conceptually, different stages in a two-stage game played among fast food
vendors. Given the intractability of estimating two-stage games in limited data, however, we focus on the second (pricing)
stage and take product design as given.
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means of identifying the structure of competitive pricing. Next, we describe the data
used to estimate this model and explain the details ofour estimation method. The fourth
section discusses the estimation results and hypothesis tests regarding the possibility
that firms exploit the potential addictiveness oftheir products and whether this realiza
tion leads to higher or lower fast food prices. The final section concludes and offers some
implications for potential obesity-control policies that may be directed toward the fast
food industry.

A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Oligopoly
Pricing with Addiction
The fact that static and dynamic models of demand have different implications for
optimal firm pricing behavior is well understood (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Becker,
Grossman, and Murphy, 1994; Showalter, 1999; Driskill and McCafferty, 2001; Villas
Boas, 2006). Yet, there are relatively few empirical studies examining the impact of
addictiveness on firm pricing behavior when the addiction is formed over a specific
ingredient or attribute of the product itself in a multi-attribute context-particularly
when firms have market power. This is somewhat surprising because addiction neces
sarily forms over a functional attribute and not the product-e.g., smokers are not likely
to be addicted to the activity of smoking any more than coffee drinkers can become
physically addicted to decaffeinated coffee. Therefore, in this section we review the
theoretical results on pricing addictive products in imperfect competition in order to
draw a distinction between what we expect to observe in competitive and noncompet
itive environments.
Showalter (1999) develops a dynamic model of consumer demand for cigarettes
produced by a monopolist manufacturer. Assuming the market consists of a single,
representative consumer, he shows that when firms are forward looking it does not
matter whether the consumer is rational (forward looking) or myopic, as firms will set
their prices in anticipation of expected future demand. More importantly, if consumers
are rational, then they understand the firm's incentive to reduce prices initially to build
a stock of addicts, only to increase prices in the future. However, assuming firms are
able to practice intertemporal price discrimination is not realistic when multiple
generations of consumers are likely to coexist and prices do not change over time. 6
Villas-Boas (2006), on the other hand, develops an overlapping-generations model to
show that firms may price either below marginal cost, or above the competitive level.
The latter result accrues if potentially addicted consumers recognize that consumption
today may lead to higher prices in the future. Ifso, their demand today can become more
inelastic, thus resulting in higher prices in the current period instead of lower. The
indeterminacy of this result, however, is not useful for empirical purposes.
Driskill and McCafferty (2001) adopt a definition of utility similar to that of Becker,
Grossman, and Murphy (1994), but cast their model instead in a continuous-time,
infinite horizon framework and derive a Markov-perfect equilibrium among oligopoly
suppliers of an addictive good. As shown by these authors, the optimal price can indeed
6 As evidence in support of this assumption, compare fast food pricing with haircuts. Fast food vendors do not charge
children and adults different prices for the same meals, as hair salons do. Most offer children's meals, but adults are not
prevented from buying them, nor are children prevented from buYing adult meals. Ifchildren and adults paid different prices
for the same items, then restaurants could be accused of intertemporal price discrimination.
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be below marginal cost in a steady-state equilibrium if marginal cost is rising and the
decay rate is not too rapid. Further, like Karp (1996) before them, Driskill and McCaf
ferty conclude market power can be profit-reducing to firms that possess it. 7
To summarize the theoretical literature, addictiveness alone will not guarantee
below-marginal-cost pricing, but addictiveness to specific ingredients or nutrients when
combined with market power can cause some ofthe ingredients to have negative implicit
values, thereby contributing to products that are priced below their marginal cost of
production. Because ingredient formulation and product design are the central elements
of a differentiated strategy intended to yield higher prices, evidence of negative implicit
ingredient prices is likely due to dynamic pricing strategies by competing firms.

An Empirical Test of Brand Loyalty or Addiction
A Hedonic Model in Fast Food Nutrients
The empirical test is designed to differentiate between pricing behavior consistent with
brand loyalty, as defined by a strategy of product differentiation, and pricing intended
to exploit nutrient addiction. In time-series data, the distinction between brand loyalty
and addiction would be relatively easy to draw given the taxonomy developed by Becker,
Grossman, and Murphy (1994). Specifically, brand loyalty, or what Becker and Murphy
(1988) refer to as "myopic addiction," is a form of intertemporal demand in which con
sumers respond only to past prices and consumption levels, whereas a rational addiction
reflects expectations of future prices and consumption. With only cross-sectional data
on fast food prices, however, we must look elsewhere for a way to distinguish between
the two.
Explicit recognition of the spatial nature of fast food characteristics and imperfectly
competitive pricing provides a very simple, albeit indirect, alternative. The primary way
in which fast food firms establish brand loyalty is through product formulation-taste,
texture, aroma, and appearance are all critical variables in food design found to influ
ence preferences and repurchase behavior. Just as the components of a car determine
its power, feel, and design, the nutritional elements of fast food comprise a clear,
measurable way of comparing food attributes that are otherwise unmeasurable. Hence,
by estimating a spatial econometric model in fast food nutrient space, we are able to test
whether fast food companies price their products similar to those near in attribute space
in order to gain market share (in the sense of Hotelling) or much higher if they are
sharply differentiated (distant in attribute space).8

7 Specifically, Driskill and McCafferty (2001) show that when firms producing addictive or durable goods have market
power, they price so as to influence future market demand as well as to take advantage ofcurrent market power. But because
consumers are aware ofthis fact, they behave under the assumption that the monopolist will likely raise prices in the future.
In the absence of the ability to commit to a path of output that guarantees higher future prices, and if marginal costs are
rising, monopoly firms will thus overproduce in the Markov-perfect equilibrium and generate lower profits than if the
industry were less concentrated.
8 Hotelling (1929) develops a metaphor for product differentiation wherein a market ("main street") consists of a finite
number of heterogeneous consumers whose preferences are uniformly distributed but are not known by firms. If the value
to any individual consumer ofchoosing a product that lies some distance from her location on main street falls in the distance
she must travel, then a firm can steal rival business by reducing its price, thus attracting more consumers willing to "travel"
a larger distance.
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To test for a departure from competitive pricing, we use an equilibrium pricing model
under oligopolistic competition that yields a hedonic, or characteristic demand specifi
cation (Rosen, 1974; Brown, 1983; Brown and Rosen, 1982; Ekeland, Heckman, and
Nesheim, 2004). A characteristic approach is necessary because we only have access to
nutritional attribute and price data for a number ofdifferentiated products. Because the
traditional model of Rosen (1974) applies only in perfect competition, however, we
develop a more general approach using the distance metric (DM) method of Pinkse,
Slade, and Brett (2002), Pinkse and Slade (1998, 2004), and Slade (2004) to estimate
best-reply functions to account for the dynamic nature of nutrient demand. 9
By focusing on the supply-side problem, we assume firms compete in prices taking one
another's product design (nutrient contents) as given and that fast food vendors sell
differentiated menu items to individual consumers (households). Indirect utility is
defined over individual fast food items and is assumed to be normalized quadratic
(Berndt, Fuss, and Waverman, 1977; McFadden, 1978; Pinkse and Slade, 2004; Slade,
2004). The normalized quadratic represents an appropriate choice of functional form
because it is a relatively parsimonious specification which is locally flexible, non
increasing in prices, symmetric, linearly homogeneous, continuous, and twice differen
tiable. It is not convex by construction, but the necessary parametric restrictions are
easily imposed. Further, aggregate demands are independent of the distribution of
consumer heterogeneity or differences in income among households (Slade, 2004).
Perhaps most important for this study, it yields linear demands.
While linear demands are not preferred on theoretical grounds, they are necessary
given the complexity of the estimation method described below. Households allocate a
fixed amount of income y among fast food items qj sold by firms} (where} = 1, 2, ..., J)
at prices Pj and a composite good, Q. Although this assumption is relaxed in the
empirical model below, we assume here that each firm sells only one item. Further, each
product is comprised of differing proportions of i = 1, 2, ..., I nutritional attributes, so
Xji represents one element of the J x I composition matrix, x. Therefore, utility is ulti
mately determined by the composition of each product purchased.
Given this preference structure, aggregate indirect utility is written as:

(1)
where all prices and income are normalized by the price of the composite commodity,
W, so that p = W-1p andy = W-1y, and cx 2 is a scalar parameter,
and P2 are J x 1
parameter vectors, and PI is a J x J matrix of price-response parameters. Below, we
show that "1 and PI are, in turn, functions of the set of nutritional attributes. lo In cross
sectional data, we set W = 1 because the price of the composite commodity is not likely
to vary over households (Pinkse, Slade, and Brett, 2002). With this normalization, the
indirect utility function then becomes:

"1

9 Independent ofPinkse and Slade (1998), Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) also develop a structural spatial approach to
estimating market conduct by oligopolistic firms selling products containing multiple attributes. Their econometric approach,
however, also requires data on demand quantities, so does not have a purely hedonic interpretation. With respect to food
products, Ladd and Suvannunt (1976) specify a structural hedonic model they use to estimate the marginal value of
nutritional attributes.
10 Note that incorporating product attributes in the indirect utility function in this way is similar to the differentiated
products demand system derived by Davis (1995) which uses the "modifYing function" approach ofLewbel (1985) to incorpor
ate demographic scaling factors. Gorman (1976) and Pollak and Wales (1978) originally developed this method of "scaling"
demand parameters.
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(2)
By allowing indirect utility to be a function of fast food attributes [equation (2)], the
distance metric approach represents a synthesis of traditional demand analysis and
hedonic estimation. There are two important points to note in this regard. First, empir
ical hedonic models typically are not linear in product attributes because this implies
shadow values are constant for all nutrient-density levels (Witte, Sumka, and Erekson,
1979). Therefore, the 4 1 parameter vector in (2) is composed of quadratic functions of
food attributes such that each element is written as:
CX1j(Xj ) =

L CXIOiXij + ~ L CXlliXi~·
i

i

Second, note that the utility function in (2) is implicitly separable in other goods and
strictly concave in nutrients (Cropper et aI., 1993; Arguea and Hsiao, 1993). By Roy's
theorem, the demand for fast food sold by firm j is found by differentiating (2) with
respect to the price, Pj' whereby:

(3)
where xj is the jth row of X. 11
We now turn to the supply side of the model. Given the evidence presented in the
introduction regarding the profitability of firms in the industry, and their efforts to
develop new products and unique brands, we assume firms compete as differentiated
oligopolists. With fast food demands in (3), the firm profit-maximization problem is
solved by choosing a price (Pj) to maximize current profit:

(4)
where cj is the marginal cost of producing fast food by firm j. Solving the first-order
condition to (4) for the optimal price by firmj leads to the best-reply function:

(5)

Pj

cj - Al (CX1j(Xj ) +
Pljj

~ P1kj(Xj)Pk + P2j Y) ,

Vj,

k:i'J

so the price set by firm} depends on marginal cost, the embodied attributes of its
product, all·other firms' prices, and the distance between its product and all others in
attribute space. In this form, however, equation (5) is not estimable in a market with
many other products (firms) because the coefficient vector Plkj expands directly with the
sample size, or the number of firms in the market. Consequently, we follow Pinkse,
Slade, and Brett (2002) by allowing each Plkj to be a common function Plkj =g(dkj ) of
the distance (in attribute space) between observations k and}, where g(dkj ) is an ele
ment of the spatial weight matrix, G. In fact, we define g(dkj ) in three different ways,
reflecting two of the principal means by which distance can be defined in attribute
space: (a) proximity, and (b) contiguity.

11 As Slade (2004) explains, the marginal utility of income is a price index that varies over observations in the data set,
but not over consumers, and thus can be normalized to 1.0. This assumption is valid given our data describe only a cross
section of fast food prices within a single metropolitan market.
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First, gp(dkj ) is defined as the inverse Euclidean distance between products k andj
such that:

~lkj ~10P ( 1 + 2 ~ (x1k - Xlj)2) -¥.!,
where PlOp is a spatial-autoregressive parameter that captures the importance of
"nearness" among all observations. Intuitively, weighting all other observations by the
inverse distance from the observation in question in the econometric model reflects the
expectation that products closer to each other in attribute space should be stronger
substitutes, and vice versa. Analogous to lagging explanatory variables in time-series
models, the expectation is that observations further away from each other will exert less
ofan influence on each other's demand. Euclidean distance, however, implicitly imposes
the assumption that the distance in anyone direction (any attribute) has the same
influence as any other. Because this may not be the case, we define two other contiguity
matrices which serve to partition the attribute-distance matrix G into elements that
measure whether firms are "neighbors" within the same firm (Gf ) or belong to the same
product class (Gg).Note that there will be one autoregressive parameter, PlOp, P10f' or
P10g' for each definition ofG. With these three measures ofdistance, the cross-price elas
ticity matrix reflects how "close" a competitor each fast food item is to all others.
The pricing model in (5) differs from a traditional hedonic pricing model in a funda
mental way. Specifically, as Pakes (2003), Feenstra (1995), and Feenstra and Levinsohn
(1995) suggest, product differentiation allows for nonzero margins in Bertrand rivalry.
Therefore, the "shadow values" derived from equation (5) are more accurately inter
preted as the marginal-residual value to firm j after allowing for the response of all
other firms and all expected future profit. Indeed, the estimated marginal value in this
case may be negative, even when the researcher's priors are almost certainly the opposite.
After accounting for all other factors that may influence a fast food vendor's price-cost
margin, if the residual shadow value remains nonpositive, it must be due to some other
factor influencing the firm's pricing behavior. In a static, multi-product model, DeGraba
(2006) argues that firms may set prices for loss leaders below marginal cost ifbuyers of
the loss-leader product can be expected to purchase more of all other products in the
store. Although this represents a plausible explanation for why turkey prices fall at
Thanksgiving (hosts are likely to buy more of all associated products), it does not
explain why implicit nutrient prices may be negative. Because the vast majority of fast
food consumers buy only two or three items per visit (NPD Group), it is unlikely that
there is sufficient profit incentive in these other products to warrant a significant loss
on the main item. Rather, firms have potentially much more to gain by pricing addictive
products such that their consumers have an incentive to buy more fast food over time.
In terms of the empirical model shown in (5), the implicit price of nutrient i is found
by differentiating the solution for the price-cost margin so that:

(6)

e.
1,

=

a(p.

c.)

)

ax..
1,)

where

)

\;j

i,
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when g is defined in terms of inverse Euclidean distance. Implicit nutrient prices are
thus determined by two factors: (a) an autonomous component that changes linearly in
the level of the attribute, and (b) a component that depends on the distance between a
product and its rivals. If firms compete as differentiated oligopolists, the second term
in (6) is greater than zero because differentiation leads to higher margins. On the other
hand, if this term is less than zero, then firms reduce margins as they imitate rival
products in the expectation of building market share. In terms of the entire expression
in (6), the market share effect reinforces the autonomous negative implicit price of
addictive nutrients (CX IOi ' CXlliXij < 0), while the differentiation effect counteracts it. The
net effect, therefore, is an empirical question.
In order to identify these competitive effects, it is necessary to estimate the marginal
cost of production. Explicitly incorporating the marginal cost of each attribute is, how
ever, problematic as these costs are unobservable. Accordingly, the competitive hedonic
pricing model is modified to account for nonzero margins and imperfectly competitive
pricing by imposing a solution concept on the game played by fast food vendors and
calculating marginal cost from the estimated demand parameters. Assuming Bertrand
Nash rivalry is common in structural models ofdifferentiated-product equilibrium (e.g.,
Sudhir, 2001; Nevo, 2001), as such, it is relatively uncontroversial. As for the marginal
cost estimate, we assume cj represents the marginal cost of producing each type offast
food item where cj = c(r), and c is an index constructed from a vector of input prices, r. 12
Nevertheless, including this index of input prices, and all other firms' prices in the
estimating equation, introduces a host of econometric issues. We explain how these are
addressed in the next section.

Spatial Estimation of the Hedonic Nutrient Model
Based on the above discussion, the empirical strategy is to appropriately control for all
possible competitive pricing effects, whether firms differentiate or imitate, so that we
can isolate the independent pricing ofindividual nutrients. Negative nutrient prices will
then provide strong evidence of pricing to exploit their inherent addictiveness. In order
to estimate equation (5) using spatial methods, we generalize the single-attribute DM
method ofPinkse and Slade (2004) to incorporate several nutritional attributes. Relax
ing the assumption that each firm produces only one good, assume now that the market
consists of} = 1,2, ..., J items sold by f = 1,2, ..., F firms so that there are JF =N fast
food items in total, indexed as n = 1, 2, ..., N. The most general form of the spatial
hedonic pricing model for item n is written as:

(7)

p

=

U =

c(r) - Y10 X - Y11 X2 - Y2m G mP - YsY

AHmu

+ U,

+£,

whereatypicalelementofY1o is cx 10i lP1nn' Y11 is cx11ilP1nn' and Y2m is P10m/P1nnfordefi
nition m =p, f, or g of spatial distance; G m is an N x N matrix of spatial weights; x is
an N x I matrix of fast food nutrients; x 2 is x squared on an element-by-element basis;
12 Implicitly, we assume constant returns to scale. This assumption is justified based on the empirical results of Hiemstra
(2000), who finds only modest returns to scale among a sample offast food restaurant chains. Hiemstra uses a data set which
includes many firms that are smaller, and thus more likely to exhibit unexploited scale economies, compared to those in our
data set. Hence, his results overstate the returns to scale among our restaurants.
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r is a vector of input prices; A is the spatial error parameter; and

£ is a vector of i.i.d.
error terms. 13 The matrix H m is also an N x N matrix of spatial weights constructed in
the same way as Gm , but need not use the same definition of distance for each specifica
tion of the system. Similar definitions apply to the firm- and product-class contiguity
matrices and spatial autoregressive parameters introduced above.
Notice, however, (7) is a best-response function, so we divide each cross-sectional
observation through by its own demand-curve slope. As is true of any spatial model
(Anselin, 1988; Pinkse, Slade, and Brett, 2002), because there are as many parameters
(N) as observations, Plnn is inherently unidentified. Thus, in our empirical application
of the DM model, we follow Pinkse, Slade, and Brett in estimating reduced-form
diversion ratios (ratio of the cross-price demand response to own-price response) which
are proportional to the distance between products, gmp(dij). Whereas we estimate this
factor of proportionality parametrically, Pinkse, Slade, and Brett do so nonparamet
rically. The autoregressive parameter, Y2m' is the estimate of the effect of distance
between a product and all others in the market (multiplication by G m creates a spatially
weighted average price of all rival products) on pricing strategy in general. One impli
cation of this assumption is that the estimated shadow values are proportionate to the
own-price response parameters, reflecting the insight ofPakes (2003) referred to above.
Based on specification tests as to whether a spatial autoregressive (Y 2m * 0, A =0, SAR)
or spatial error (y 2m = 0, A * 0, SEM) is more appropriate, we test the primary hypothesis
of the paper-whether fast food companies appear to exploit the addictiveness of the
nutrients in their food.

Tests of the Addiction-Market Power Hypothesis
By partitioning the spatial weight matrix into firm- and product-specific components,
we are able to test specific hypotheses as to whether fast food firms tend to differentiate
their menu offerings from others and how they implicitly price nutrient attributes.
Specifically, if Y2j < 0, then each fast food chain differentiates its own products inter
nally, attempting to meet a wide variety of tastes with a single menu. Because utility
is assumed to rise in variety (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), firms are able to charge higher
prices on differentiated menu items. This is the differentiation, or market power effect.
On the other hand, if it is the case that Y2j > 0, then individual chains tend to
aggressively "cluster" products in terms of nutrients and price in an attempt to gain
market share. This is the market share effect.
A symmetric argument applies to the product-class weight matrix, Gg • IfY2g < 0, then
firms tend to differentiate each item from others in the product class (i.e., hamburgers,
french fries, etc.) offered by other firms. Again, diff~rentiation is achieved through each
item's nutritional profile. 14 In contrast, if it is the case that Y2g > 0, then firms tend to
offer products which mimic each other as they attempt to gain market share. To sum
marize the possible outcomes, we define four joint tests of the spatial-lag and shadow
value parameters:
13 Using consistent estimates of u above, we test the spatial autoregressive (SAR) null hypothesis that A = 0 with a
Lagrange multiplier (LM-SAR) test statistic given in LeSage (1998). We also apply Moran, Lagrange multiplier, Wald, and
likelihood-ratio tests under the assumption that u's are estimated using OLS instead of the MLE SAR estimates.
14 Taste is, of course, an important component to design, but tends to vary by individual and therefore is not quantifiable.
We allow for differences in taste by including an error term in the price-response function that is individual, rather than
product-specific.
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Differentiation / Pricing Below Marginal Cost:
H 1 :Y2g<0,8i <0,

where 8i refers to the shadow value ofpotentially addictive nutrients from equation
(6), which will be negative if firms want to price goods high in this nutrient below
marginal cost. In this case, the greater the distance between two products in attri
bute space, the greater their difference in price. Addictive nutrients, however, have
negative shadow values in order to attract as many addicted consumers as possible.
• HYPOTHESIS 2. No

Differentiation / Pricing Below Marginal Cost:
H 2:Y2g=0,8 i <0.

In the second case, firms do not differentiate their products, but do price nutrients
so as to collectively exploit their addictiveness.
• HYPOTHESIS 3.

Inter-Firm Differentiation / Intra-Firm Imitation / Pricing Below

Marginal Cost:

H3 :Y2g<0, Y2j>0, 8i <0.
Third, firms differentiate like items from those of their competitors, but tend to
cluster their own products around a relatively similar nutritional profile. They then
exploit any brand loyalty which arises by pricing goods high in addictive nutrients
such that the nutrients have negative shadow values.
• HYPOTHESIS 4. No

Pricing Below Marginal Cost:

H4 : 8i

~

o.

Finally, it may instead be the case that firms simply do not recognize the addictive
ness of fast food or, if they do, are constrained by competitive pressures from
appropriating any rents from building a stock of addicted consumers.

Estimation Method
Clearly, the system described in (7) must be estimated using a method to account for the
endogeneity of rival prices. Anselin (1988) and LeSage (1998) describe the alternatives.
Typically, maximum likelihood is used to estimate the general model, but this approach
is not feasible with multiple spatial-weight matrices (Kalnins, 2003). Therefore, we use
a generalized method ofmoments (GMM) estimator. 15 By choosing the parameter vector
in order to minimize the GMM objective function, this method provides parameter esti
mates that are consistent even when elements of the matrix of explanatory variables,
Z, are endogenous or measured with error and will be minimum variance if the error
terms are normally distributed.
15 Kelejian and Prucha (1998,1999) describe a two-stage GMM estimator for the more general spatial autoregressive/
spatial error model, which Bell and Bockstael (2000) apply to residential sales data. However, as discussed below, we fail to
reject the null hypothesis that A = 0 when firm- and item-specific weight matrices are used. Thus, we use the single-stage
GMM estimator described by Anselin (1988), where the GMM weighting matrix is defined as White's (1980) consistent
heteroskedastic matrix with weights calculated from variances derived from a first-stage instrumental-variable regression.
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Importantly, selecting appropriate instruments for prices is key. In this regard, we
follow Pinkse and Slade (2004) in choosing, first, all exogenous indicator variables and
firm-specific nutrient values, under the assumption explained above that nutrients are
assumed to be predetermined in our model. Second, we create another set of instru
ments by multiplying rival firm product attributes by different spatial weight matrices,
G. This is the method suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999), as it is possible
to create a number of suitable instruments by using different definitions of G, different
powers of each element of the weight matrix, and different elements of the rival
attribute set. For example, we define one instrument in terms of a "nearest-neighbor"
definition of distance, where the neighborhood is defined in terms of attribute space,
instead of the firm and product classifications defined above. Each product's nearest
neighbor is defined on a minimum-distance basis where distance is Euclidean in the five
macronutrients. Of course, each product has only one nearest neighbor, so the matrix
simply consists of one binary indicator for the closest product in attribute space. By
multiplying the nearest-neighbor distance matrix by the set of rival attributes, the
instrument consists of the attributes of the closest product.
This procedure is identical to the approach suggested by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995) in the context of a mixed-Iogit model of demand. Villas-Boas (2003) also adopts
a similar procedure and provides a detailed justification for doing so. In addition to the
nearest-neighbor instrument, we create instruments using the inverse Euclidean dis
tance and product-class neighbor matrices defined above. Clearly, rival choice variables
meet the requirements for good indicators: they are independent ofthe regression errors
in the own-firm's hedonic pricing equation, but likely to be correlated with the price of
the own-firm's fast food item.

Data Description
The data for this study consist of prices and nutrient profiles for a cross-section of items
offered by the seven most popular fast food chains in the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan
area: McDonalds, Burger King, Wendy's, Sonic, A&W, Jack-in-the-Box, and Carl's Jr.
The set of products includes all hamburgers, chicken sandwiches, chicken nuggets,
french fries, milkshakes, desserts, and other side items. For this analysis, it was neces
sary to drop observations on fish sandwiches, hot dogs, and other specialty items for
which there were no comparable offerings at other chains. All prices were gathered by
surveying fast food restaurants in the Phoenix metro area. Although Kalnins (2003)
documents considerable price variation both within and among chains throughout the
entire state ofTexas, we observed little price variation within chains in our study area. 16
Therefore, these prices are representative ofthe competitive landscape in a fairly typical
urban market. All prices are expressed on a per gram basis.
Input prices were obtained from the Bureau ofLabor Statistics, Producer Price Index
(PPI) file. For each product, a small set of input prices was chosen to form an index of
relevant prices. For hamburgers, input prices consist ofground beef, white flour, cheese,
lettuce, and tomatoes. For chicken sandwiches, we include a price index for young poultry,
16 If prices were to differ for the same items at other locations, it is not the level of prices that concerns us, but the varia
bility from restaurant to restaurant and product to product. Although the specific prices may differ depending on the location
of the restaurant, the way in which they are set does not. In other words, fast food prices are set to reflect cost and
competitive conditions as well as considerations of the strength of demand for each product.
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including broilers, fryers, and roasters, in addition to the other burger component prices.
Chicken nuggets are a function ofwhole chicken prices, vegetable oil, and flour. French
fry prices are a function of frozen potato and vegetable oil prices, while the cost of
producing milkshakes depends on price indices for milk and sugar. Similarly, dessert
costs include milk and sugar, in addition to flour and oil.
Because the set of inputs varies by product in our cross-sectional data, we cannot
estimate a complete, parametric marginal cost function as in Pinske, Slade, and Brett
(2002) or Villas-Boas (2003). Rather, we create simple linear sums across the index
components that vary by fast food item. While these indices are only proximate, varia
tion among them will capture differences in prices. By specifying the nature ofthe game
being played in (5), we then are able to recover marginal cost by estimating the first
order condition (Berry, 1994). Because the indices do not vary over chains, they provide
a measure of product-specific pricing strategy.17
Nutrient profiles for all items were constructed from publicly available data sources,
whether company websites or Nutritiondata.com, and expressed as nutrient densities,
or grams ofnutrient per grams offood. Nutrients include the major macronutrients: fat,
protein, and carbohydrates, in addition to a specific type of carbohydrate (sugar) and a
trace element, sodium. Sugar and sodium are included because they are widely used
taste modifiers and have been shown to produce significant sensory responses in
consumers, thereby being more likely to be addictive nutrients. Sodium is expressed in
terms of milligrams per gram of food, which is a standard metric in the nutritional
literature. Total calories are not included because they would be highly collinear with
a linear combination of fat, protein, and carbohydrate content. Although using this
relatively large set of nutrients results in a large number offirm-specific shadow-value
estimates in the nonlinear model, any smaller set would run the risk of missing a
critical attribute valued by consumers. All other attributes that influence consumers'
preferences for the fast food item are either embodied in the firm-specific coefficient or
are included in the regression error term.
Table 1 provides a summary of prices, estimated marginal costs, and nutrient contents
by fast food item category, averaged over the sample chains. As expected, burgers are
the highest in terms of fat content, but are also high in protein, while french fries are
high in terms of both fat and carbohydrates. Desserts and milkshakes are the most
sugar-intensive of the products considered here, but provide the least cost per 100g of
all the items considered. In fact, these products are also the only two items priced below
marginal cost, which leads us to suspect the shadow value of sugar may be a primary
factor in this outcome. Although burgers are high in fat, which should cause them to be
priced below marginal cost, they also contain high levels of protein-an attribute not
likely to have a negative shadow value. Confirmation of this finding requires a more
careful analysis of the estimated results reported in the next section.

Results and Discussion
In this section, we present the results obtained from estimating the distance metric
model in fast food prices and nutrient attributes. Prior to discussing the tests ofhypoth
eses 1-4 outlined above, however, it is first necessary to establish the appropriate form
17 Because we are only interested in marginal costs of producing fast food, labor, capital, and energy are not included in
the set of input prices comprising the indices.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Fast Food Pricing: Mean Values by Item
Price
($/100g)

Item

Marginal
Cost
($/100g)

Weight
(gms)

CarboSugar
hydrates
Protein
Sodium
Fat
(gms/gm) (gms/gm) (gms/gm) (gms/gm) (gms/gm)

Burger

1.000

0.660

267.004

0.149

0.180

0.124

4.819

0.037

Chicken Sandwich

1.298

0.813

249.900

0.099

0.209

0.122

5.099

0.028

Chicken Nuggets

1.718

0.842

184.773

0.135

0.180

0.147

7.376

0.007

Fries

1.076

0.766

145.400

0.139

0.364

0.037

4.147

0.007
0.020

Sides

0.985

0.753

214.793

0.111

0.241

0.042

5.490

Milkshake

0.500

0.712

455.463

0.064

0.221

0.032

0.936

0.203

Dessert

0.592

0.789

338.642

0.059

0.205

0.026

1.057

0.180

Notes: All nutrient values are expressed on a per gram of serving weight basis. Data are averages calculated over all
chains in the sample. Marginal costs are estimated based on the parameters in table 3.

Table 2. Spatial Specification Tests: Spatial Autoregression versus Spatial
Autocorrelation
ALTERNATIVE MODEL

1. Nonspatial Regression Model
Test

Test Statistic

2. Spatial Autoregressive Model
Model

Test Statistic

Moran Test

0.136

Gp

4.982*

LMTest

0.465

Gg

0.018

Wald Test

1.279

Gj

0.229

LRTest

0.809

Gj,Gg

0.076

G p , G j , Gg

0.014

Notes: A single asterisk (*) denotes rejection ofthe null hypothesis at the 5% level. In each case, the null hypothesis
is H o: A = 0, where A is the spatial autocorrelation parameter described in the text. In the first set of tests, the
alternative model is a simple, nonspatial regression model. In the second set of tests, the alternative model is a
spatial autoregressive model with one offive alternative spatial-weight definitions: Gp consists ofelements that are
inverse Euclidean distances in attributes across firms and items, Gf consists of inverse Euclidean distances in
attributes across firms, and Gg consists of distances across items. All tests in column 1 are based on simulated
maximum-likelihood estimation, and those in column 2 on generalized method ofmoments (GMM) estimates. All test
statistics are X2 distributed with one degree of freedom, except for the Moran test statistic, which is asymptotically
normal.

ofthe econometric model. Given the number of alternative ways of defining the structure
of the spatial model, the first set of results presented in this section consists of a series
of specification tests-i.e., whether it should be a spatial autoregressive, spatial error
model, or one that combines elements of both. With the preferred form of the model, we
then proceed to test the primary hypotheses of the paper, namely, whether fast food
prices exhibit evidence of differentiation and nutrient-specific addictiveness. Based on
these results, we offer some important implications for industry conduct and possible
policy designs to counter fast-food-related obesity issues.
Table 2 reports the results obtained from testing the null hypothesis (Ho: A= 0) using
the battery oftests described in LeSage (1998) and the alternative weight specifications
discussed above. The test statistics in the first column compare a nonspatial model
under the null hypothesis to a spatial error model, or SEM. None of these tests suggest
rejection of the nullhypothesis. The test statistics in the second column refer to the same
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null, but the alternative consists of various forms of the spatial autoregressive (SAR)
model. These results are interesting because they suggest that simple application of a
single spatial weight matrix can lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the appropriate
structure of the model. Specifically, when only a single, attribute-based weight matrix
is used (Gp ), the LM-SAR test suggests that a general spatial autocorrelation (SAC
model in LeSage's terminology) is required. However, when firm and item contiguity is
included, A is no longer significant and the appropriate model is a relatively simple SAR
specification.
Quasi-likelihood ratio (QLR) tests are used to select among the SAR variants (Gallant
and Jorgenson, 1979). A QLR test compares the value of the GMM objective function
from an unrestricted model to a restricted alternative. The difference is X2 distributed
with degrees offreedom equal to the number of restrictions. According to the results in
table 2, the QLR test suggests the preferred model is the all-inclusive spatial model, or
the one that includes attribute weights, firm-specific weights, and item-specific weights.
Finding that the most comprehensive definition of distance dominates the others is
consistent with the results reported by Pinkse, Slade, and Brett (2002), and Kalnins
(2003), who also use multiple spatial weight specifications to describe distance and
contiguity with rival firms. Anticipating the results presented in table 3, this model also
provides a high percentage of significant coefficients, plausible parameter estimates,
and a broad agreement with the other model results reported in this table. Hence, we
use the most comprehensive spatial model to test hypotheses regarding brand loyalty
and nutrient-specific pricing.
To evaluate the robustness of the hedonic price estimates across model specification,
table 3 includes the GMM parameter estimates from each ofthe alternative SAR models.
In these results, brand loyalty has two dimensions. First, table 3 includes estimates of
firm-specific price premia-the coefficients on the firm-binary variables. As discussed
above, to control for product-specific pricing and pricing above marginal cost, we include
an index of input prices for each product. Firm-level indicator variables allow for varia
tions in product prices due to advertising, reputation, in-store marketing, and other
unobservable, firm-specific effects likely to be correlated with price.
Assuming firms are competitive in all nonprice marketing strategies, the most impor
tant determinant offirm-specific price premiums is likely to be brand loyalty. Although
not all of the firm-specific coefficients in table 3 are significantly different from zero in
the preferred model specification, the premia are relatively robust across models and
they are jointly different from zero. We therefore interpret this finding as evidence that
each firm does indeed have some brand loyalty. The degree of brand loyalty, however,
varies widely among sample firms. For example, in table 3, A&W represents the excluded
firm-specific indicator variable, so each of the other firms (except firm 6) receives a
lower margin than A&W on each equivalent product. Interestingly, A&W represents an
example of a firm with a uniquely loyal following, arguably attracted by a signature
item (root beer and root beer floats) not offered by any other firm. On the other hand,
with respect to hamburgers, McDonalds earns a margin that is $0.082 less than A&W. 18
Nonetheless, each margin is still positive.

18 It is also important to note that, as a subsidiary ofYum! Brands, Inc., A&W plays a critical role as the flagship brand
of a major fast food market participant in the most important submarket-hamburgers. Consequently, it is backed by more
financial, marketing, and operational capital than other chains of similar size would be.
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Table 3. Fast Food Spatial Characteristics Model Estimates: GMM
Gg only
Gp , G j , and Gg
Est. / (t- Ratio) Est.! (t- Ratio)

Nonspatial
Est. / (t- Ratio)

Gp only
Est. / (t- Ratio)

Gg and Gj
Est.! (t- Ratio)

Gp

NA

0.576*
(7.413)

NA

NA

0.782
(1.902)

Gj

NA

NA

0.665*
(3.112)

NA

0.696*
(2.926)

Gg

NA

NA

-0.221
(-0.764)

0.459*
(6.434)

-0.836
(-1.873)

Variable

Firm 1

-0.092
(-1.223)

-0.091
(-1.194)

-0.083
(-1.089)

-0.097
(-1.282)

-0.082
(-1.070)

Firm 2

-0.177*
(-3.222)

-0.154*
(-2.713)

-0.176*
(-3.137)

-0.158*
(-2.863)

-0.190*
(-3.275)

Firm 3

-0.128*
(-2.153)

-0.121*
(-2.132)

-0.116*
(-2.061)

-0.130*
(-2.306)

-0.102
(-1.809)

Firm 4

-0.077
(-1.210)

-0.066
(-1.077)

-0.064
(-1.032)

-0.086
(-1.415)

-0.031
(-0.546)

Firm 5

-0.147*
(-2.148)

-0.122
(-1.875)

-0.102
(-1.548)

-0.122
(-1.881)

-0.087
(-1.298)

Firm 6

0.019
(0.346)

0.043
(0.846)

0.052
(1.014)

0.024
(0.478)

0.081
(1.548)

MCl

-0.129*
(-3.643)

-0.112*
(-3.624)

-0.132*
(-4.249)

-0.117*
(-3.841)

-0.125*
(-4.001)

MC2

0.024
(0.414)

0.043
(0.857)

0.007
(0.143)

0.048
(0.960)

-0.008
(-1.298)

MC3

0.053
(0.937)

0.058
(1.206)

0.037
(0.730)

0.059
(1.229)

0.035
(0.701)

MC4

-0.023
(-0.052)

-0.058
(-1.481)

-0.078
(-1.955)

-0.037
(-1.732)

-0.106*
(-2.549)

MC5

-0.036
(-0.698)

-0.053
(-1.233)

-0.088*
(-1.973)

-0.034
(-1.871)

-0.116*
(-2.577)

MC6

-0.077*
(-3.072)

-0.061*
(-2.665)

-0.059*
(-2.508)

-0.045
(-1.924)

-0.078*
(-3.196)

Fat

0.118
(0.775)

0.016
(0.111)

-0.045
(-0.293)

0.062
(0.429)

-0.205
(-1.223)

Carbo

0.667*
(3.622)

0.546*
(3.097)

0.501*
(2.720)

0.453*
(2.511)

0.633*
(3.476)

Protein

0.310*
(2.331)

0.021
(0.149)

0.160
(1.136)

0.108
(0.790)

0.085
(0.562)

Sodium

0.381*
(4.375)

0.301*
(3.704)

0.454*
(4.394)

0.288*
(3.726)

0.471*
(3.981)

-0.035
(-0.317)

-0.206*
(-1.994)

-0.309*
(-3.025)

-0.157
(-1.532)

-0.376*
(-3.497)

0.135
(1.825)

0.167*
(2.262)

0.182*
(2.520)

0.168*
(2.328)

0.208*
(2.724)

-0.233*
(-3.157)

-0.200*
(-2.929)

-0.143*
(-1.956)

-0.159*
(-2.234)

-0.189*
(-2.660)

Sugar
Fat 2
Carb0 2

( continued ... )
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Table 3. Continued
Variable

Nonspatial
Est.!(t-Ratio)

Gp only
Est. / (t- Ratio)

Gg and Gj
Est.! (t- Ratio)

Gg only
Gp , Gj , and Gg
Est. / (t- Ratio) Est.! (t- Ratio)

Protein 2

-0.004
(-0.644)

0.110
(1.735)

0.059
(0.937)

0.076
(1.245)

0.083
(1.201)

Sodium 2

-0.127*
(-3.149)

-0.152*
(-3.863)

-0.140*
(-3.795)

-0.124*
(-3.413)

-0.170*
(-3.492)

Sugar 2

-0.003
(-0.653)

0.117*
(2.032)

0.128*
(2.281)

0.090
(1.581)

0.158*
(2.707)

GMM
QLR

119.231

100.147
19.084

97.646
21.585

104.576
14.655

91.264
27.967

Notes: A single asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Firm 1 = McDonalds, Firm 2 = Wendy's, Firm
=Burger King, Firm 4 =Carl's Jr., Firm 5 =Jack-in-the-Box, and Firm 6 =Sonic. Me refers to the marginal cost of
producing item 1 =hamburger, item 2 =chicken sandwich, item 3 =chicken nuggets, item 4 =french fries, item 5 =side
dish, and item 6 = milkshake (item 7 = dessert, and is defined as the base case). The QLR statistic is a quasi-likelihood
ratio statistic defined as QLR = (GMMR GMMu ), where GMMR is the restricted value of the GMM criterion function
(GMM) and GMMu is the unrestricted value. The resulting test statistic is X2 distributed with degrees of freedom equal
to the number of implied restrictions. In this table, all models are general cases of the nonspatial model. The critical X2
value with one restrictionat the 5% level ofsignificance is 3.841, with two restrictions is 5.991, and with three restrictions
is 7.815.
3

Second, the firm-specific spatial autoregressive parameters indicate whether firms
differentiate their foods from one another (Y2g < 0), thereby earning brand loyalty
through differentiation, or if they tend to mimic one another (Y2g > 0) in an attempt to
earn market share by moving to the middle ground. When Gg enters the model on its
own, the results in table 3 suggest firms tend to choose similar nutritional profiles for
like items. However, the fit ofthis model is significantly worse than the preferred model
which includes Gp and Gf . Indeed, comparing the autoregressive parameters from the
preferred model to the other, partial models indicates that firms tend to cluster their
own menus and tend to follow other firms in a general way, but differentiate individual
items. Although not significant in a two-tailed test at a 5% level, Y2g is significant in a
one-tailed test, so we are led to conclude that firms do indeed differentiate their menus
by altering nutritional profiles for specific items. Consequently, of the two effects
measured by the distance metric model-market share or market power-the latter
appears to dominate the former. Thus, it appears we can rule out hypothesis 2.
Whether firms price below marginal cost, however, depends upon the nutrient shadow
values. These values, which are point estimates calculated over the entire sample,
appear in table 4. Ofthe potentially addictive nutrients, the estimates for the preferred
model (row 5 in the table) suggest that both fat and sugar indeed have negative implicit
prices. Although this result is robust among the alternative spatial models in the case
of sugar, the estimated shadow value is positive for fat in three of the five models.
Among the other nutrients, carbohydrates and proteins have positive implicit prices
both in an economic and a statistical sense. Sodium, on the other hand, has a negative
implicit price over all five models, but never in a statistically significant way. Conse
quently, combining the results from tables 3 and 4, our findings suggest that fast food
companies recognize both the value in differentiating products and in exploiting the
potential addictiveness of the nutrients in fast food in order to build a cohort of loyal,
addicted customers.

Journal ofAgricultural and Resource Economics

442 December 2007

Table 4. Nutrient Shadow Value Estimates for Alternative Spatial Models
Model

8 Fat

8 Carb

8protein

8Sodium

8Sugar

1. Nonspatial

0.144*
(0.014)

0.563*
(0.042)

0.309*
(0.004)

-0.451
(0.646)

-0.035*
(0.006)

2. Gp

0.049*
(0.017)

0.456*
(0.036)

0.035*
(0.011)

-0.697
(0.775)

-0.182*
(0.021)

3. Gg

0.096*
(0.017)

0.382*
(0.029)

0.118*
(0.007)

-0.527
(0.633)

-0.139*
(0.017)

4. G j , Gg

-0.083*
(0.019)

0.437*
(0.026)

0.167*
(0.006)

-0.465
(0.714)

-0.283*
(0.023)

5. Gp , G j , Gg

-0.163*
(0.022)

0.549*
(0.034)

0.096*
(0.008)

-0.646
(0.867)

-0.345*
(0.029)

Notes: A single asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. All shadow values (6 i ) are generated from
the GMM estimation procedure. Values in parentheses are standard errors, calculated using a Wald test statistic
evaluated at the sample mean.

A formal test ofhypotheses 1-4 consists of a joint Wald chi-squared test ofthe restric
tions implied by each. To test these hypotheses, however, it is first necessary to rephrase
each in terms of a testable null. Thus, the first hypothesis becomes H o: Y2g ~ 0, 8 i ~ 0,
and rejection of this null with a one-tailed test implies firms do not cluster products
around common nutritional profiles, nor do addictive nutrients have positive shadow
prices. Each of the other hypotheses are constructed similarly. Because the nutritional
research cited in the introduction indicates that fat and sugar are the most likely
nutrients to produce addictive responses in consumers, the joint tests consist of the
item-specific autoregressive parameter, as well as the shadow value for both fat and
sugar. For hypothesis 1, the X2 value is 14.106, while the critical X2 value at a 5% level
of significance and three restrictions is 9.35 (for a one-tailed test). Consequently, we can
reject the first null. Rejecting a null hypothesis, however, provides only indirect support
for the alternative, so we can only tentatively conclude that firms in this sample differ
entiate their menus from their competitors using nutrient profiles. Iffirms differentiate
their products in nutrient space, then doing so generates a measure of market power,
thus exploiting the addictiveness of fat and sugar by pricing each below their implied
marginal cost.
Due to the arguments outlined above regarding the statistical significance of the
shadow values for fat and sugar, H 2 and H 4 are ruled out immediately because they are
dominated by HI and H 3 • For H 3 , the null hypothesis is H o: Y2g ~ 0, Y2j ~ 0, 8 i ~ 0, which
is again evaluated using a one-tailed test. ~n this case, the critical value with four restric
tions is 11.143, while the calculated value is 19.157. Rejection ofthis null again provides
indirect support for the assertion that firms not only differentiate specific items from
their competitors, but offer menus which are relatively homogeneous. Catering to their
target market in this way, fast food companies build a further dimension ofbrand loyalty
and add to their ability to price addictive products without fear oflosing their customers
to other fast food firms. Note, however, that the sample used here describes only one
segment of the fast food market (hamburger vendors), while a wider sample of quick
service firms including sandwich chains (Subway, Quiznos), Mexican food (Taco Bell,
Del Taco), or Chinese (Panda Express) would be necessary to generate stronger support
for this result.

Richards, Patterson, and Hamilton

Fast Food, Addiction, and Market Power 443

Importantly, the shadow value functions for fat and sugar are convex. In other words,
the implied shadow values rise for higher densities of each nutrient. While the results
described to this point explain 99¢ hamburgers and inexpensive, jumbo-size soft drinks,
convexity also explains why some ofthe recently introduced items such as the "Monster
Thick Burger" or premium cookies sell for high prices despite the fact that they are
loaded with fat and sugar. Specifically, the more fat or sugar a product has, the "less
negative" is the shadow value of those nutritional components. Convex shadow value
functions for some nutrients are, in turn, explained by the knife's-edge solution to the
dynamic pricing game under addiction. In particular, recall the learning mechanism
described by Villas-Boas (2006). Ifthe marginal forward-looking consumer understands
that by purchasing a fast food item this period she will face higher prices next period,
she is likely to become less price sensitive in the current period. As a result, equilibrium
prices rise in the current period with the degree oflearning, or addiction in this case. On
the other hand, iffirms believe that the market-building effect ofpricing fat- and sugar
laden products below marginal cost is more important than capitalizing on current profit
opportunities, then high-fat and high-sugar foods will be priced below cost in order to
build up the cohort of addicted consumers. Therefore, products with moderate levels of
fat and sugar are likely to be priced below marginal cost, while products which are very
high in either will command premium prices.
This result has significant implications for anti-obesity policy. Indeed, proposals for
nutrient-specific policies have circulated within political circles for some time now. "Fat
taxes" or "protein subsidies" are two examples of the wide range of price-based policies
used by policy makers to induce individuals to change their behavior, and firms to
change their pricing practices. Iffast food companies price below marginal cost with the
intention of creating a new set of addicts, then such a tax would be effective in coun
tering this particular strategy.19
What does a convex nutrient-value function mean for anti-obesity policy? Consider
another side of the learning dynamic cited above. According to the logic of Becker and
Murphy (1988), pricing items with moderate sugar content below marginal cost and
high-sugar items above marginal cost could be due to a "tolerance effect" wherein fat
addicted consumers require more and more to achieve the same level of utility as they
previously enjoyed with relatively low-fat foods. Firms increase the price of high-fat
items as consumers' addiction becomes more severe, and prevalent in aggregate. 20
Consequently, and somewhat counterintuitively, the optimal nutrient tax should b.e
highly nonlinear-zero at low nutrient density levels, higher for moderate levels of fat
or sugar, but then lower still as firms raise prices to exploit current-period addiction
rents. By raising the price of moderately high fat- and sugar-content items, consumers
will be induced to pay the full cost or choose a healthier option.
The implications for product design are also clear and suggestive of future work in
this area. Implicitly, fast food companies understand what products attract customers
due to their inherent taste or addictive qualities-high-sugar items such as milkshakes
and dessert treats-and price them accordingly. Future research, should price and con
sumption data become available, could endogenize food nutrient content in a structural
19 As a reviewer suggests, it is important to note the fundamentally regressive nature of a fat tax. Therefore, although it
may be effective in reducing fat consumption, a fat tax is likely to fall on lower income groups in an inequitable way.
20 Note that this finding is also consistent with casual industry observation-most "value deal" meals consist primarily of
a hamburger, one side, an order of fries, and a drink, but it is the hamburger that is the loss leader among this group.
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framework similar to Cropper et al. (1993) or Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004).
In this way, researchers could not only address the problem of nutrient endogeneity in
a more complete way, but also provide better answers to questions surrounding the
strategic nature offast food product design. Given this type ofdata, important question's
regarding the role of advertising and marketing strategies could be addressed as well.

Conclusions and Implications
This study investigates pricing behavior by fast food companies on a product and nutri
ent level. Prior theoretical work on optimal pricing by firms with market power when
demand is linked intertemporally, either through brand loyalty or nutrient addiction,
shows firms may have an incentive to price below marginal cost in order to build a group
ofaddicted consumers. Ifaddiction is not firm-specific, however, this incentive disappears
as the habitual consumption of nutrients becomes more akin to a common property
resource than a source ofmonopoly rents. In contrast, ifconsumers are forward-looking,
their demand in the current period may become more inelastic if they suspect their
addiction will lead to higher prices in the future. Thus, prices for products containing
addictive nutrients may instead be higher than would ot~erwise be the case.
We test for which ofthese two effects dominates using an equilibrium distance metric
model for fast food in the Phoenix market. Unlike traditional hedonic pricing models,
the distance metric approach allows for imperfectly competitive pricing where market
power derives from nutrient-based product differentiation strategies. In order to test
which pricing strategy best describes fast food seller conduct, we estimate the distance
metric model using spatial econometric methods where products lie at different points
in a multi-dimensional attribute (nutrient) space. Estimating firm- and item-specific
autoregression parameters reveals whether firms tend to differentiate their products
from one another, or offer relatively homogeneous items. The spatial attribute model is
estimated using a generalized method ofmoments procedure that accounts for the likely
endogeneity of rival prices.
Based on our estimation results, fast food companies tend to differentiate their
products from rival offerings on an item-by-item basis. In other words, the price for a
particular item will rise the farther it is from the others in attribute space. Additionally,
and more importantly, we find that the average steady-state shadow prices for fat and
sugar are significantly below zero. We interpret this result as consistent with a strategy
of pricing items high in potentially addictive nutrients below marginal cost, thereby
building a community of consumers who are not just loyal to a particular firm's offerings,
but addicted to them. Although firms price fat- and sugar-filled products below marginal
cost, they tend to price high carbohydrate- and protein-content foods significantly above,
suggesting these items may bear the burden of differentiating the restaurant from
others. Moreover, the shadow values for fat and sugar are highly convex, so prices for
the most fat- and sugar-dense foods are likely to be relatively high due to the inherent
attractiveness of these nutrients.
Future research will investigate the deeper implications of these results for product
design by formally endogenizing nutrient content in a structural model of price and
nutrient rivalry. It is expected that competition in nutrients will provide important
insight into how nonprice marketing strategies impact price outcomes in the fast
food market. These results will also help policy makers design programs to combat an
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important cause of the obesity epidemic. In particular, our results suggest a somewhat
counterintuitive fat-tax policy-raising taxes for moderately fat- or sugar-intensive
foods in order to reduce the incentive for firms to exploit the potential addictiveness of
their products.
[Received March 2007; final revision received October 2007.]
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